







































same,	such	extra-special	properties	must	be	recognized	in	each	case	(since	in	each	case	a	corresponding	belief	can	be	had	that	would	target	the	original	property).			 One	may	wonder	whether	there	really	are	such	properties,	and	indeed	whether	we	fully	understand	what	these	properties	are	supposed	to	be.	But	the	deeper	problem	is	different.	The	purpose	of	introducing	visible-only	and	audible-only	properties	was	to	rid	us	of	vision	and	audition	as	distinctive	modes	of	perception.	The	new	picture	was	to	replace	the	variety	of	perceptual	ways	of	representing	the	same	entities	with	a	single	generic	way	of	representing	different	entities.	This	generic	way	of	representing	is	a	sort	of	sensory	entertaining,	which	can	take	as	objects	a	variety	of	very	different	entities,	including	visible-only	properties,	audible-only	properties,	and	so	on.	On	this	view,	seeing	a	shape	is	not	a	matter	of	visually-representing	the	shape,	but	a	matter	of	entertaining	the	look-of-the-shape;	hearing	something	overhead	is	not	a	matter	of	auditorily-representing	overhead-ness,	but	of	entertaining	the-sound-of-overhead-ness.	There	is	no	point	in	introducing	the	visible-only	properties,	audible-only	properties,	olfactible-only	properties	etc.	if	we	also	preserve	distinct	perceptual	modes	of	representing	these	properties.	That	would	be	a	kind	of	theoretical	overkill,	where	one	of	the	two	posits	(special	perceptible	properties	or	perceptual	modes)	is	bound	to	be	explanatorily	preempted	by	the	other.			 Accordingly,	extending	the	same	strategy	to	non-perceptual	experiences,	by	introducing	such	properties	as	the	fearsomeness-of-danger	and	the	loveableness-of-loveliness,	would	involve	ridding	ourselves	of	fear,	love,	and	other	emotional	modes	in	favor	of	a	single,	uniform	mode	of	emotional	entertaining.	To	fear	a	dog,	on	this	view,	is	to	entertain	the	dog’s	fearsome-dangerousness;	to	love	a	person	is	to	entertain	the	person’s	loveable-loveliness;	and	so	on.	All	emotions	employ	a	single,	uniform	mode	of	being	aware	of	something	–	they	differ	only	in	what	one	is	aware	of	under	that	mode.			 In	fact,	given	that	the	representationalist	ultimately	wants	to	account	also	for	the	phenomenal	difference	between	seeing	a	dog	and	fearing	a	dog,	she	cannot	even	avail	herself	of	a	distinction	between	sensory	entertaining	and	emotional	entertaining.	Rather,	there	must	be	a	single	kind	of	pure	entertaining,	which	can	be	aimed	at	sensible	properties	or	at	emotable	properties;	the	difference	between	seeing	a	dog	and	fearing	a	dog	is	thus	ultimately	a	matter	of	what	one	entertains	in	this	pure	way.	Thus	to	fulfill	its	promise,	(reductive)	representationalism	must	hold	that	all	phenomenally	conscious	states	share	this	single	way	of	aiming	at	external	entities.	
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	 We	can	see	how	implausible	this	is	by	comparing	and	contrasting	the	case	of	belief	and	desire.	There	are	of	course	several	differences	between	belief	and	desire,	including	in	functional	role	and	‘direction	of	fit.’	But	it	is	often	thought	that	there	is	also	a	fundamental	difference	in	the	way	belief	and	desire	represent	what	they	do.	In	particular,	it	is	natural	to	claim	that	belief	that	p	involves	a	commitment	to	the	truth	of	p	(or	to	the	obtaining	of	p),	whereas	a	desire	that	p	involves	a	commitment	to	the	
goodness	of	p	(in	some	suitably	generic	sense	of	‘goodness’).	Believing	that	there	is	whiskey	at	the	party	in	some	sense	commits	one	to	the	truth	of	the	proposition	<	there	is	whisky	at	the	party	>	(or	to	the	obtaining	of	the	state	of	affairs	of	there	being	whisky	at	the	party).	In	contrast,	desiring	that	there	be	whisky	at	the	party	commits	one	to	the	goodness	of	the	state	of	affairs	of	there	being	whiskey	at	the	party.	However,	we	do	not	tend	to	think	that	believing	that	p	is	just	entertaining	that	
p	is	true	(or	that	p	obtains),	nor	that	desiring	that	p	is	just	entertaining	that	p	is	(or	would	be)	good.	Infants	and	animals	lacking	the	concepts	of	truth	and	goodness	can	still	believe	and	desire,	which	suggests	that	the	concepts	of	truth	and	goodness	are	
not	constituents	of	their	relevant	mental	state’s	propositional	contents.	More	deeply,	it	seems	to	be	in	the	nature	of	entertaining	that	as	long	as	one	merely	entertains	the	truth	of	p,	one	is	not	yet	committed	to	the	truth	of	p.	It	is	precisely	in	the	act	of	believing	that	p,	or	coming	to	believe	that	p,	that	one	commits	oneself	to	the	truth	of	
p.	Likewise,	desiring	p	involves	a	certain	mental	commitment	to	the	goodness	of	p	that	merely	entertaining	the	goodness	of	p	does	not.			 On	reflection,	the	same	kind	of	difference	can	be	seen	when	we	compare	fearing	a	dog	and	entertaining	the	dog’s	(fearsome-)dangerousness.	The	fear	
commits	one	to	the	dog’s	dangerousness,	whereas	mere	entertainment	of	the	dog’s	dangerousness	does	not.	Sometimes	contemplating	a	dangerous	thing	overmuch	may	lead	us	to	suddenly	experience	fear	regarding	it.	But	the	relation	here	is	causal	rather	than	constitutive:	we	move	from	one	mental	state	(the	contemplation)	to	a	new,	different	mental	state	(the	fear)	–	with	the	difference	being	precisely	that	only	the	new	one	embodies	commitment	to	the	thing’s	(fearsome-)dangerousness.	The	proponent	of	attitudinal-representational	properties	has	a	natural	explanation	of	this	difference:	fearing	the	dog	involves	representing-as-dangerous	the	dog,	whereas	entertaining	the	dog’s	(fearsome-)dangerousness	involves	only	representing	the	dog-as-(fearsomely-)dangerous.14		
ge	The	representationalist	may	resist	this	line	of	thought	by	attempting	to	reductively	account	for	the	attitudinal-representational	properties	of	fear	and	admiration	in	terms	of	those	of	belief	and	desire	(see,	e.g.,	Marks	1982,	Gordon	1987).	For	example,	she	might	suggest	that	fearing	a	dog	is	just	a	matter	of	believing	that	the	
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dog	is	present	and	dangerous	and	desiring	that	the	dog	be	absent	or	undangerous.	If	this	kind	of	reductive	account	could	be	carried	out	satisfactorily	for	all	emotional	attitudinal-representational	properties,	it	would	create	a	different	kind	of	unity	in	our	picture	of	mind,	perhaps	deeper	than	that	which	treats	fear	and	admiration	as	on	a	par	with	belief	and	desire.		 An	immediate	obstacle	to	this	gambit	is	the	apparent	fact	that	the	belief	and	desire	appealed	to	in	the	account	have	propositional	content,	whereas	the	fear	allegedly	accounted	for	has	non-propositional	content.	It	is	unclear	how	any	combination	of	propositional	attitudes	can	constitute	a	non-propositional	attitude.		To	overcome	this	immediate	obstacle,	the	representationalist	must	adopt	a	more	indirect	reductive	strategy:	first	account	for	fearing	x	in	terms	of	fearing	that	p,	
then	account	for	fearing	that	p	in	terms	of	the	right	combination	of	belief	and	desire.	And	likewise	for	all	other	apparently	objectual,	non-propositional	emotional	attitudes,	such	as	love,	admiration,	and	so	on.	However,	both	parts	of	this	indirect	strategy	are	quite	dubious.	Consider	first	the	notion	that	all	emotions	have	propositional	content.	On	this	view,	when,	upon	feeling	a	surge	of	love	for	my	spouse,	I	say	‘I	love	you,’	my	utterance	reflects	badly	the	structure	of	the	conscious	state	it	expresses.	A	less	misleading	utterance	would	take	the	form	‘I	love	that	__________________.’	But	how	are	we	to	fill	in	the	blank?	‘I	love	that	you	exist’	seems	to	express	at	most	an	aspect,	or	an	implication,	of	what	‘I	love	you’	expresses.	‘I	love	that	you	are	lovely’	is	multiply	problematic.	For	starters,	as	we	saw	it	is	far	from	clear	what	‘lovely’	stands	for	here.	More	deeply,	loving	that	a	is	F	appears	to	imply	taking	a	to	be	F,	but	a	person	in	the	clutches	of	a	pathological	relationship	may	not	take	her	beloved	to	have	whatever	property	‘lovely’	is	supposed	to	stand	for.	(By	the	same	token,	a	person	in	the	clutches	of	arachnophobia	may	fear	a	spider	she	does	not	take	to	be	dangerous.	It	would	then	be	plausible	to	say	that	she	fears	the	spider	but	not	that	she	fears	that	the	spider	is	dangerous.)	Furthermore,	‘I	love	that	you	are	lovely’	seems	to	involve	the	kind	of	theoretical	overkill	by	which	we	duplicate	what	makes	a	mental	state	one	of	love.	The	more	accurate	utterance	would	have	to	be	‘I	entertain	that	you	are	lovely.’	But	as	noted,	mere	entertainment	does	not	seem	to	involve	that	special	emotional	commitment	that	loving	embodies.	(I	would	be	quite	disappointed	to	hear	that	my	spouse	entertains	my	loveliness!)	This	is	why	we	normally	entertain	the	loveliness	of	so	many	more	people	than	we	actually	love.	It	thus	appears	very	hard	to	find	a	remotely	plausible	propositional	rendering	of	‘I	love	you’	–	which	tellingly	should	come	as	good	news	to	all	the	beloved	of	the	earth.	Likewise	for	other	objectual	emotions	(Forbes	2000,	Montague	2007).15	
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So	much,	then,	for	the	notion	that	all	emotions	have	propositional	content.	Even	if	they	did,	however,	the	analysis	of	propositional	emotions	in	terms	of	belief	and	desire	is	highly	problematic.	In	particular,	it	faces	a	dilemma	when	it	comes	to	the	question	of	whether	belief	and	desire	are	phenomenally	conscious	states.	The	mainstream	view	in	the	philosophy	of	mind	of	the	past	half-century	has	been	that	such	states	–	certainly	belief	–	have	no	proprietary	phenomenal	character.	And	while	recent	debates	on	so-called	cognitive	phenomenology	(Bayne	and	Montague	2011)	raise	the	specter	of	phenomenal	consciousness	in	belief	(and	desire)	anew,	reductive	representationalists	have	tended	to	insist	that	belief	and	desire	are	non-phenomenal	states	(Tye	and	Wright	2011).	Plausibly,	however,	mental	states	such	as	fearing	that	the	dog	might	bite	you	are	(sometimes)	phenomenally	conscious	–	there	is	something	it	is	like	to	experience	such	a	fear.16	If	believing	that	p	and	desiring	that	q	have	no	phenomenal	character,	while	fearing	that	r	does	have	phenomenal	character,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	fearing	that	r	could	be	nothing	but	the	combination	of	believing	that	p	and	desiring	that	q.	Even	if	just	believing	that	p	has	no	phenomenal	character,	while	both	desiring	that	q	fearing	that	r	do,	it	remains	hard	to	see	how	fearing	that	r	could	simply	consist	in	the	combination	of	believing	that	p	and	desiring	that	q,	given	that	fearing	that	the	dog	might	bite	you	is	so	phenomenally	different	from	desiring	that	the	dog	not	bite	you	(and	indeed	from	desiring	that	q	for	any	q).17	For	the	strategy	to	have	any	chance,	then,	the	representationalist	must	allow	belief	and	desire	to	be	phenomenally	conscious	states.	A	modest	allowance	grants	belief	a	phenomenal	character,	but	not	a	proprietary	one.	The	phenomenal	character	of	believing	that	p	is	exhausted,	the	story	goes,	by	an	auditory	image	of	the	sentence	‘p’	recited	in	silent	speech	(or	by	a	visual	image	of	the	sentence	passing	before	the	mind’s	eye)	(see,	e.g.,	Robinson	2006).	This	kind	of	phenomenal	character	seems	insufficiently	rich,	however,	to	capture	the	feel	of	fear.	It	is	one	thing	to	claim	that	the	phenomenology	of	believing	that	the	dog	is	dangerous	involves	grasping	the	property	of	being	dangerous,	or	grasping	the	concept	DANGER,	and	that	the	phenomenology	of	grasping	this	property	or	concept	is	all	there	is	to	the	phenomenology	of	fear.	But	here	the	claim	is	that	the	phenomenology	of	believing	that	the	dog	is	dangerous	only	involves	grasping	the	sound	/ˈdānjər/	(or	the	shape	d^a^n^g^e^r).	This	kind	of	purely	auditory	(or	visual)	phenomenology	seems	to	have	no	resources	for	capturing	the	felt	quality	of	fear.	Subjectively,	fearing	something	is	not	just	‘hearing’	sounds	in	one’s	mind’s	ear	or	‘seeing’	shapes	in	one’s	mind’s	eye.		A	more	generous	allowance	is	thus	called	for,	granting	belief	and	desire	
proprietary	phenomenal	characters.	Once	we	do	so,	however,	any	pair	of	cognitive	
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and	conative	experiences,	say	consciously	believing	that	that	there	is	whisky	at	the	party	and	consciously	desiring	that	there	be	whisky	at	the	party,	would	already	constitute	an	immediate	counter-example	to	representationalism.	For	such	a	pair	involves	two	phenomenally	different	states	with	the	very	same	representational	content.	Moreover,	the	phenomenal	difference	between	the	two	would	appear	to	trace	back	to	their	distinctive	attitudinal-representational	properties.	We	have	already	noted	that	belief	appears	to	involve	mental	commitment	to	the	truth	of	what	is	believed,	and	desire	a	commitment	to	the	goodness	of	what	is	desired,	without	truth	and	goodness	showing	up	in	their	respective	contents	themselves.18	That	is,	belief	is	characterized	by	the	attitudinal-representational	property	of	representing-as-true,	desire	by	that	of	representing-as-good.	Given	content	identity,	the	phenomenal	difference	between	conscious-believing	that	p	and	conscious-desiring	that	p	seems	to	trace	back	to	the	difference	between	representing-as-true	and	representing-as-good.		
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In	conclusion.	Experiences	such	as	fearing	a	dog	or	loving	one’s	spouse	appear	irreducibly	objectual,	admitting	of	no	reductive	analysis	in	terms	of	propositional	states	such	as	belief	and	desire.	Moreover,	it	is	extremely	odd,	and	incongruent	with	the	rest	of	our	picture	of	mind,	to	cast	all	such	experiences	as	involving	a	single,	uniform	attitude	of	pure	entertaining	toward	certain	special	properties.	And	finally,	the	whole	idea	that	such	emotional	experiences	are	directed	at	properties,	or	states	of	affairs,	or	other	entities	wholly	or	partially	non-concrete,	is	in	any	case	incredible.	Thus	the	hope	of	accounting	for	the	identity	conditions	of	all	phenomenally	conscious	states	entirely	in	terms	of	what	these	states	represent	runs	into	major	obstacles	at	every	turn.	It	is	considerably	more	plausible	to	simply	admit	that	phenomenally	conscious	states	individuate	partly	in	terms	of	how	they	represent,	that	is,	in	terms	of	distinctive	attitudinal-representational	properties	they	exhibit.	Such	attitudinal-representational	properties	not	only	exist,	then,	but	are	phenomenally	manifest.	So:	among	the	phenomenal	properties	our	conscious	states	instantiate	are	attitudinal-representational	properties,	properties	that	do	not	have	to	do	with	what	our	conscious	states	represent.			 		
4. Conclusion:	Accentuating	the	Positive		Our	critique	of	representationalism	is	not	merely	destructive.	It	is	also	instructive.	For	it	suggests	a	rather	concrete	picture	of	phenomenal	consciousness.	In	this	picture,	phenomenal	character	is	determined	by	the	conspiracy	of	at	least	two	factors:	representational	content	and	representational	attitude	or	mode.	What	it	is	
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like	to	fear	a	dog	is	fixed	partly	by	the	fact	that	a	dog	is	what	one	fears	and	partly	by	the	fact	that	fearing	is	what	one	feels	toward	the	dog.			 Once	we	recognize	the	role	of	attitudinal-representational	properties	in	emotional	experience,	it	becomes	natural	to	posit	them	elsewhere	in	our	theory	of	phenomenal	consciousness.	Compare	a	visual	experience	of	a	dog	and	an	experience	of	visualizing	a	qualitatively	indistinguishable	dog	(a	dog	with	all	the	same	visible	surface	features).	Suppose	that	due	to	extraordinary	circumstances,	involving	fogs	and	mirrors	and	much	more	besides,	the	degree	of	vivacity,	clarity,	precision,	and	resolution	of	the	two	experiences	is	identical.	Hume	might	maintain	that	in	that	circumstance	there	is	no	phenomenal	difference	between	the	two	experiences.	This	assumes	that	there	is	no	phenomenal	difference	between	vision	and	visualization	as	
such.	But	it	is	not	outlandish	to	think	that	these	experiences	do	differ	phenomenally,	though	not	due	to	what	they	represent.	Rather,	they	differ	in	virtue	of	how	they	represent.	Perhaps	the	difference	is	something	like	this:	the	visual	experience	of	the	dog	represents-as-real	the	dog,	whereas	the	visualization	of	the	dog	represents-as-
unreal	(or	perhaps	represents-as-imaginary)	the	dog.	Perhaps	it	is	rather	that	the	visual	experience	represents-as-present	whereas	the	visualization	represents-as-absent	the	dog.	Perhaps	the	difference	pertains	to	some	other	distinctive	attitudinal-representational	properties.	The	idea,	in	any	case,	is	that	the	overall	phenomenal	character	of	both	vision	and	visualization	is	fixed	in	part	by	attitudinal-representational	properties	these	instantiate.	I	have	not	argued	for	this	idea	here,	but	the	admission	of	a	role	for	attitudinal-representational	properties	in	phenomenal-state	individuation	in	the	emotional	domain	lends	a	minimal	prima	facie	plausibility	to	the	idea	–	the	kind	of	minimal	plausibility	that	recommends	closer	examination.	And	what	is	true	of	vision	and	visualization	may	be	true,	more	generally,	of	perception	and	imagination.19			 A	similar	contrast	may	attend	perception	and	episodic	memory.	Consider	two	subjects,	one	of	whom	watching	the	rain	falling	and	the	other	episodically	remembering	a	qualitatively	indistinguishable	rain;	suppose	again	the	world	conspires	to	equate	the	levels	of	vivacity,	clarity,	precision,	and	resolution	in	their	respective	experiences.	Here	too,	there	is	a	view	worth	examining	that	casts	the	two	experiences	as	phenomenally	type-different	in	virtue	of	their	attitudinal-representational	properties.	The	most	natural	version	of	this	second	view	would	be	that	while	episodic	remembering	of	the	rain	represents-as-past	the	rain,	its	perceiving	represents-as-present	the	rain.	Again,	I	do	not	argue	for	this	view	here,	but	do	note	its	structural	symmetry	to	the	view	I	have	argued	for	in	the	emotional	domain.20		
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	 Since	POSITIVE	is	only	an	existential	thesis,	the	case	of	emotional	experience	suffices	to	support	POSITIVE.	The	case	of	imagination	and	episodic	memory	is	a	dialectical	luxury	I	have	not	indulged	here.	At	the	same	time,	once	we	have	admitted	the	ineluctability	of	attitudinal-representational	properties	in	one	area	of	phenomenal	consciousness,	there	is	not	much	of	an	additional	cost	in	introducing	them	in	other	areas.	Thus	POSITIVE,	supported	by	considerations	of	emotional	experience,	may	inspire	a	unified	theory	of	phenomenal	consciousness	that	constitutes	a	substantial	alternative	to	(reductive)	representationalism.21			
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§ Tye,	M.	and	B.	Wright	2011.	‘Is	There	a	Phenomenology	of	Thought?’	In	Bayne	and	Montague	2011.																																																												1	Particularly	influential	in	this	has	been	an	early	paper	by	Harman	(1990).	For	fuller	developments	of	representationalism,	see	Shoemaker	1994,	Dretske	1995,	and	Tye	1995.	Other	important	defenses	of	the	view	are	Byrne	2001	and	Thau	2002.			2	This	has	to	do	with	a	certain	dissatisfaction	with	the	notion	of	supervenience,	as	a	philosophical	tool,	which	has	become	widespread	across	many	areas	of	philosophy.	Crushing	many	subtleties,	we	may	say	that	supervenience	is	not	an	explanatory	relation,	which	makes	it	unsuited	to	carry,	all	by	itself,	the	burden	of	various	projects	of	philosophical	explanation	–	much	less	the	burden	of	reductive	philosophical	explanation.	The	fact	that	supervenience	representationalism	does	not	answer	Q	is	but	a	symptom	of	that.		3	Some	philosophers	deny	that	(the	right	kind	of)	representational	content	can	be	fully	understood	in	entirely	non-phenomenal	terms	(Horgan	and	Tienson	2002,	Loar	2003).	When	philosophers	combine	commitment	to	THIRD	with	this	non-reductivism	about	representational	content,	they	end	up	with	non-reductive	representationalism	(Chalmers	2004,	Pautz	2010).			4	This	position	comes	in	two	varieties,	depending	on	whether	one	holds	(a)	that	both	rectangularity	and	the-look-of-rectangularity	(or	the-sounds-of-rectangularity)	show	up	in	phenomenal	consciousness	or	(b)	that	only	the-look-of-rectangularity	(or	the-sound-of-rectangularity)	does.	This	difference	will	not	matter	to	our	discussion.		5	A	representationalist	taking	this	line	could	also	deny	that	there	really	is	the	audible-only	feature	of	rectangularity,	and	on	that	ground	deny	that	auditory	shape	experiences	truly	exist.	This	appears	to	be	Dretske’s	(2000)	response	to	Lopes’	case.	The	idea	is	to	concede	that	there	are	auditorily-based	rectangularity	beliefs,	but	deny	that	it	follows	there	must	be	auditory	shape	experiences.		6	From	the	perspective	of	FEAR	and	ADMIRATION,	the	notion	that	danger	and	admirability	appear	in	the	
contents	of	fear	and	admiration	is	an	instance	of	what	Barwise	and	Perry	(1983)	called	‘the	fallacy	of	misplaced	information.’		
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																																																																																																																																																																					7	Keep	in	mind	that	we	are	using	representation	talk	in	such	a	way	that	a	hallucination	of	a	lemon	in	a	lemonless	world	does	not	represent	nothing.	In	this	usage,	a	mental	state	that	represents	nothing	is	not	just	a	hallucination	or	a	mental	state	for	which	there	is	nothing	in	the	world	that	fits	what	it	purports	to	be	about;	rather,	it	is	a	mental	state	that	does	not	purport	to	be	about	anything.				8	Note	that	POSITIVE	is	a	merely	existential	thesis,	making	no	claim	to	the	effect	that	all	phenomenally	conscious	states	owe	their	identity	in	part	to	the	attitudinal-representational	properties	they	exhibit.	One	reason	for	this	measure	of	modesty	is	simply	that,	since	THIRD	is	a	universal	claim,	an	existential	counter-claim	is	enough	to	undermine	it.		9	The	two	difficulties	are	independent	of	each	other.	The	claim	that	no	entity	lends	itself	only	to	conscious	representation	applies	within	each	mode	of	experience.	It	states	that	it	should	be	possible,	for	any	property	which	is	represented	in	an	auditory	experience,	to	imagine	that	very	property	being	represented	in	‘subliminal’	auditory	perception;	that	any	property	which	can	be	represented	by	a	conscious	flair	of	anger	should	be	also	available	for	representation	in	suppressed	anger	as	well;	and	so	on.	Here	the	specific	mode	plays	no	special	role.	Indeed,	the	problem	would	apply	even	if	there	were	no	experiential	modes.	In	contrast,	the	difficulty	to	be	developed	in	the	argument	from	non-perceptual	modes	concerns	the	relations	between	different	modes	of	experience.			10	Consider:	(FOURTH)	For	every	phenomenally	conscious	state	S,	there	is	a	class	of	representational	properties	R,	such	that	what	makes	S	the	phenomenally	conscious	state	it	is,	and	a	phenomenally	conscious	state	at	all,	is	that	S	instantiates	the	members	of	R	it	does,	and	instantiates	members	of	R	at	all.	(Unlike	THIRD,	FOURTH	is	consistent	with	POSITIVE,	insofar	as	attitudinal-representational	properties	are	representational	properties.)		11	The	distinction	is	drawn	before	Chalmers	for	the	question	of	perceptual	experience	by	Block	(1996),	who	calls	impure	representationalism	‘quasi-representationism,’	and	Byrne	(1997),	who	calls	it	‘intramodal	intentionalism.’		12	I	am	assuming	here	that	there	is	a	close	link	between	reductivism	and	purism.	Recall	that	according	to	REDUCTIVE,	the	representational	content	of	phenomenally	conscious	states	can	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	non-phenomenal	facts,	that	is,	facts	no	constituent	of	which	is	phenomenal.	The	main	representationalist	strategy	in	this	area	attempts	to	account	for	representational	content	is	in	terms	of	causal,	informational,	and/or	teleological	relations	between	conscious	states	and	worldly	entities.	Even	granting	the	success	of	this	reductive	enterprise,	impure	representationalism	would	insist	that	a	reductive	philosophical	explanation	of	phenomenal	consciousness	would	also	require	a	reductive	account	of	attitudinal-representational	properties.	Of	course,	none	of	this	rules	out	the	existence	of	some	other	reductive	strategy,	more	suitable	for	attitudinal-representational	properties.	But	the	point	I	hope	to	establish	here	is	only	that	the	representationalist	reductive	strategy	–	appealing	centrally	to	informational	semantics,	teleosemantics,	and	so	on	–	runs	into	a	dead	end	once	we	move	from	pure	to	impure	representationalism.		13	I	underline	the	occurrence	of	‘possible’	in	this	statement	–	there	is	no	claim	of	infallibility	here!		14	The	representationalist,	in	contrast,	must	deny	that	fearing	a	dog	is	different	from	entertaining	the	dog’s	(fearsome-)dangerousness.	In	doing	so,	she	appears	to	introduce	a	major	disunity	into	our	picture	of	the	mind.	If	belief	and	desire,	as	the	paradigmatic	mental	states,	have	distinctive	attitudinal-representational	properties,	then	a	picture	where	fear	and	admiration	have	their	own	is	mutatis	mutandis	more	unified	than	a	picture	where	they	do	not.		15	In	the	domain	of	perception,	too,	we	tend	to	distinguish	perceiving	x	from	perceiving	that	p.	The	notion	that	we	can	somehow	reduce	the	former	to	the	latter	appears	very	much	a	non-starter.	Crucially,	perceiving	x	does	not	require	the	possession	of	any	concepts,	whereas	perceiving	that	p	does	(Dretske	1993).	An	infant	who	encounters	a	squirrel	for	the	first	time	sees	the	squirrel	but	does	
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																																																																																																																																																																					not	see	that	it	is	a	squirrel,	lacking	as	she	does	the	concept	of	a	squirrel.	If	the	infant	is	old	enough,	she	may	perceive	that	there	is	a	reddish-brown,	squirrely-shaped	thing	before	her.	But	the	infant	may	not	be	old	enough	–	she	may	be	so	young	that	she	lacks	even	a	concept	for	the	relevant	color	(perhaps	the	squirrel	dancing	before	her	is	the	first	object	she	encounters	which	has	any	red	or	brown	in	it),	not	to	mention	a	concept	for	the	relevant	shape.	Thus	it	is	highly	unlikely	that	perceiving	x	could	be	satisfactorily	analyzed	in	terms	of	perceiving	that	p.	It	would	be	surprising,	then,	if	loving	x	could	be	analyzed	in	terms	of	loving	that	p,	admiring	x	in	terms	of	admiring	that	p,	fearing	x	in	terms	of	fearing	that	p,	and	so	on.		16	Compare:	there	is	something	it	is	like	to	see	that	the	squirrel	is	reddish-brown	(Clausen	2008).		17	Note	that	in	the	present	dialectical	context	the	representationalist	cannot	respond	that	phenomenal	character	of	fear	that	p	simply	derives	from,	or	consists	in,	the	phenomenal	character	of	some	accompanying	fear	of	x	(e.g.,	that	the	phenomenal	character	of	fearing	that	dog	will	bite	you	consists	in	that	of	fearing	the	dog	or	the	dog’s	potential	bite);	for	the	representationalist	strategy	under	consideration	attempts	precisely	to	account	without	remainder	for	such	apparently	objectual,	non-propositional	fear	in	terms	of	belief	and	desire.	The	strategy	is	doomed	if	the	representationalist	concedes	that	fearing	x	has	a	phenomenal	character	whereas	belief	that	p	does	not.		18	It	would	indeed	be	odd	to	place	truth/obtaining	and	goodness	in	the	contents	of	belief	and	desire.	In	believing	that	there	is	whiskey	at	the	party,	what	one	believes	is	simply	that	there	is	whisky	at	the	
party	–	not	that	it	is	true	that	the	is	whisky	at	the	party	(nor	that	there	being	whisky	at	the	party	
obtains).	Likewise,	in	desiring	that	there	be	whisky	at	the	party,	what	one	desires	is	that	there	be	
whisky	at	the	party	–	not	that	it	be	good	if	there	be	whisky	at	the	party.	Thus	belief’s	truth-commitment	and	desire’s	goodness-commitment	do	not	appear	to	come	from	what	belief	and	desire	represent,	but	rather	from	how	they	represent	–	from	the	distinctive	ways	these	states	have	of	framing	their	contents.		19	I	argue	for	this	line	on	the	perception/imagination	distinction	in	Kriegel	2015a	Ch.6.			20	I	argue	for	this	line	of	thought	more	fully	in	Kriegel	2015b.			21	Work	on	this	paper	was	supported	by	the	French	National	Research	Agency’s	grants	ANR-11-0001-02	PSL*	and	ANR-10-LABX-0087,	as	well	as	by	grant	675415	of	the	European	Union’s	Horizon	2020	Research	and	Innovation	program.	For	comments	on	a	previous	draft,	I	am	grateful	to	David	Chalmers.		
